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Species

A History of the Idea, by John S. Wilkins. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2009. Pp. xiv + 288, index.
H/b $31.95.
It is a claim often repeated, and reinforced by the periodic publication of hefty monographs on the subject
(Coyne and Orr 2004), that there is a “species problem”
in evolutionary biology. Ernst Mayr, in his 1942 book,
wrote it into the ground floor of the New Synthesis. But
what, exactly, is the species problem – and, perhaps
more importantly, how did it arise in the first place?
John Wilkins’s book admirably tackles the first question
by means of the second – offering a deep, thorough, and
contextualized understanding of the species problem,
clarifying a number of essential issues in that debate,
and, in the process, correcting a number of persistent
misconceptions about the idea of species from Plato to
Darwin.
An encyclopedic work with an impressively broad
scope, Wilkins’s Species falls, broadly, into two parts.
The first narrates the history of the concept of species
from its roots in Plato and Aristotle to Darwin’s development of evolutionary theory. After a brief bridge, the
second looks at the roots of the contemporary species
problem, laying out both its historical outlines and the
vast array of contemporary positions one finds in the debate over the concept of species. Let’s consider each in
turn.
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“Species” from Plato to Darwin

With regard to the development of the concept of species before Darwin, Wilkins rightly notes that there is an
accepted, standard narrative of this history, constructed,
as he deftly shows, by biologists during the New Synthesis
(around 1958, in fact; p. xi). The “received view” goes
something like this. Taking a combination of Platonist essentialism and Aristotelian logic as a basis, the “species
concept” of Linnaeus and all others before Darwin holds
that species are permanent, eternal, fixed objects consisting of a set of essential or typical properties, deviations
from which can at best be monstrous. This is the bogeyman which Mayr labeled “typological thinking” (Mayr
1959), and, as the story goes, one of Darwin’s greatest accomplishments was its overthrow and replacement by
“population thinking”, the recognition that species are in
fact just a particular kind of population, and are connected
by common descent.
What is remarkable about this received history is
that, under the sustained and careful scrutiny of a
scholar such as Wilkins, none of it turns out to be
correct.
First, essentialism. Wilkins argues that the idea that
biological species have essences is based on a pervasive
misreading of ancient and medieval philosophical works,
a conflation between a logical concept of species (used
in the Aristotelian enterprise of categorization or classification of all objects and ideas, not just organisms) and
a biological concept of species (the one familiar today).
The latter – the idea that there could be such a thing as
a distinctively biological concept of species – dates only
from the seventeenth century (p. 9). One must, therefore, be exceedingly careful drawing any conclusions
about biological “species” prior to 1600.
When sufficient care is applied to the ancient and
medieval sources, then, we find that natural history in
these periods is not “essentialist” in the pernicious sense
that Mayr ascribes, but rather in the more benign manner that Wilkins dubs typology (not to be confused with
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Mayr’s use of “typological thinking”). Ancient and medieval
natural historians were interested in describing various
characteristics of organisms that could be used to diagnostically determine species membership in the field, much
like the work of today’s systematists. Far from being some
sort of concrete essence that must be exemplified by every
organism in the species, types (then, as now) can be exemplified to greater or lesser extents, and can be varied from
(p. 91) – and this is not an innovation brought about by
Darwin, but can be found dating all the way back to
Aristotle (p. 232). As Wilkins says, “[t]here is everywhere
a remarkable lack of the sort of essentialism that Mayr
and others believe permeates this period and its philosophy. While we see typology, when it comes to dealing with
biological organisms, most of the time there is no insistence on essences” (pp. 228-9).
Finally, far from being some sort of static or fixed notion, Wilkins shows that the concept of species has (again,
as far back as Aristotle) always involved what he calls a
generative conception of species. That is, the very idea of
species fundamentally comprises, at least in part, the preservation of form over time and its transmission from one
generation to the next (p. xi). It is not Darwin that supplants this view, but genetics, in finally discovering the
material basis for this temporal transmission.
This is not to say that there is no such thing as a fixed
notion of species prior to Darwin. The first proponent
of species fixism was John Ray, a seventeenth-century
British naturalist. Ray – the first philosopher ever to
develop a concept of classification that was exclusive
to the biological realm – argued that species are fixed
in number from the time of God’s creation (p. 67). Ray’s
view, in turn, is picked up by Linnaeus, who claimed that
each species was created specially by God and fixed from
that point forward (resulting in his famous dictum that
“there are as many species as the Infinite Being produced
diverse forms in the beginning,” p. 72). But rather than being the result of some throwback to Platonist forms or
Aristotelian logic, species fixism is the result of a religious response to the debates between preformationism and epigenesis in embryological development (p. 95).
“[I]t is not that species were not held to be fixed before
the seventeenth century,” Wilkins writes – “they simply
had no idea of a biological species” (p. 94).
The early nineteenth century – the background, that
is, for the introduction of Darwin’s work – was dominated by the twin influences of the generative conception of species and the idea of species fixism (p. 127). To
draw on only two of Wilkins’s many examples, Cuvier’s
geological catastrophism claims that “species come into
existence at the beginning of each geological epoch and
never vary thereafter” (p. 109), while Agassiz (the closest
thinker, Wilkins argues, to the straw man of Mayr’s
“typological thinking”) did indeed believe that species
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carried fixed essences in the mind of God, were unable
to vary over time, and that those essences genuinely
caused the characteristics of those species, rather than
merely serving as diagnostic characteristics to determine
species membership.
“Species” in the work of Darwin

Darwin’s own thoughts about species are the subject of
no small quantity of debate. It is a common trope in the
literature – Wilkins cites both Futuyma (1983) and
Coyne and Orr (2004) – that Darwin’s Origin of Species
didn’t really describe the origins of species, because
Darwin lacked a clear concept of just what species are,
and didn’t spend much time considering the mechanisms
of speciation. While remaining cognizant of the development of Darwin’s views over time (from the early notebooks through the Origin and his later works), Wilkins
clearly demonstrates that both of these claims are false.
Early in his career, especially in the notebooks, Darwin
believes that geographical isolation is an absolutely essential ingredient in the formulation of new species
(p. 148). By the time of the Origin, and through the
works which came after it, he has modified his view, giving
pride of place rather to natural selection as the driver of
speciation events – regardless of the presence or absence
of geographic isolation. And despite the fact that Darwin’s
language seems to sound at times as though he believes
that species are only terms of convenience for the use of
taxonomists, Wilkins argues that the preponderance of
the evidence weighs in favor of Darwin’s having believed
that, while the distinctions between groups of organisms
themselves, in the natural world, are genuine, the dividing
line between a species and a variety is an arbitrary one,
drawn for the benefit of the biologist (p. 144).
As is often the case in Darwin scholarship, evaluating
Wilkins’s approach to Darwin’s use of species is a significant
undertaking, and would lead us too far afield. I will mention
only that he (here, as throughout the work) appeals to an
exceptionally broad spectrum of primary source material,
making his analysis wide-ranging and comprehensive.
Darwin’s own views lead quite quickly to the nowfamiliar landscape of the debates over species in evolutionary theory. As early as 1889, we begin to see the battle lines
drawn between allopatric and sympatric theories of speciation. The first essay to attempt to parse out all “logically
possible” definitions of the concept of species is authored
by George Romanes in 1895 (p. 167), and Wilkins dates
the beginning of the fully fledged “species problem” to an
essay by E. B. Poulton in 1903 (p. 173).
The species problem

What, then, is the species problem? Prior to the work of
Darwin, work on the idea of species concerns almost exclusively how it is that species come to be in the first
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place. But after Darwin, we have ready accounts of the
production of species (whether by natural selection or
other causal mechanisms), and a different problem – the
“species problem” in its modern guise – comes to the
fore. What is it that marks out a species, as a population
engaged in some sort of gradual process of change, as a
genuine species? In Wilkins’s words, “[i]t is the problem
of defining what rank it might be that species achieve
when they become species” (p. 173).
Dobzhansky, Wilkins claims, is the first to lay out this
problem with real clarity. The definition of the concept
of species is an easy one to determine, he claims –
species are simply groups of individuals which are interfertile, but somehow physiologically prevented from
interbreeding with other species (p. 184). The gradual
nature of evolution, however, may make it impossible in
practice, at least in some cases, to determine whether or
not we have completely attained that separation (p. 185).
Huxley, on the other hand, took this difficulty in practice
to entail a conceptual problem in the notion of species
itself – casting doubt on the idea that there could be a
single coherent definition of species at all (p. 188).
“Into this ambiguity of opinion came Ernst Mayr” (p. 188),
the central figure in the development of the contemporary
species problem. Mayr’s biological species concept, developed over several decades beginning in 1940 (pp. 189-98),
still casts a long shadow over our understanding of species
in biology. Mayr’s history, as we have seen, is highly suspect. His claim that there was a single concept of species
from Plato to Linnaeus is simply wrong, as is his claim
that species were understood to be constant, unchanging,
that all deviations were considered imperfections or monsters, and so forth (p. 194). Nor was Mayr the first to have
a “biological” notion of species – as we have seen, there
has been an element of propagation, generation, transmission of form over time in the idea of species as applied to
biology, dating all the way back to Aristotle (p. 195). It is
here that we can see just how profitable Wilkins’s historical analysis has really been.
Finally, the book closes with an extended discussion of
some twenty-five “species concepts” that are currently
at play in the literature, from Mayr’s BSC and its descendants, to phylogenetic, evolutionary, ecological, and
paleontological notions of species. While this chapter
moves quickly, it constitutes an invaluable reference for
anyone interested in rapidly coming up to speed with the
landscape of this debate, and would make for a quality
teaching tool. The book’s conclusion is one of the best I
have read in recent years, lucidly laying out the book’s
main points in only seven pages.
Final thoughts

It is difficult to find anything to dislike about Wilkins’s
study. The breadth of the work is staggering, and the
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amount of research that went into its discussion of every
major intellectual figure and conceptual player in the
species debates from Plato onward is readily apparent at
every turn. Its audience is clearly, in the first instance,
historians and philosophers of biology – but it is certainly written well enough to be readable by practicing
biologists, secondary teachers, or anyone interested in
the role of species in the history of biological thought.
More importantly, its corrective to the obviously problematic histories often told about the role of species
from Plato to Darwin is essential.a After Wilkins’s analysis, it could not be clearer that Mayr’s picture of “typological thinking” must be abandoned. His separation of
“essentialism” in a pernicious sense from the still-common
use of “typology” is a welcome clarification. And the detailed, comprehensive, and unified picture of the development of the concept of species from Aristotelian logic,
through the development of biological taxonomy as a discipline in its own right, to the work of Darwin and the
contemporary debates over the species problem, offers
scholars a contextualized understanding of the use of “species” that is hard to match.
What of the prognosis? Wilkins doesn’t pretend to offer
a solution to the species problem, whatever it is that might
mean. But he does argue – correctly, in my opinion – that
the demise of what he calls the “essentialist myth” could
go a long way toward making the debate over species
more sophisticated and more tractable (pp. 233-4). This
work is positioned exceptionally well to do just that.

Endnote
a
For those interested in these problems, Wilkins’s book
is not the only recent offering in this area; see Sloan
(2013) for a helpful essay review.
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